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Preface
Marian Simms*
Head of School of History Heritage and Society, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia
The government of John Howard had enjoyed swings in both houses at the 9
October 2004 election, gaining control of the Senate from 1 July 2005. On 24
November 2007, Australian voters went to the polls for a House and half-Senate
election. In December 2004, John Howard had become Australia’s second-longest
serving Prime Minister and was seen as ‘sitting comfortably’.1 He continued to enjoy
strong poll approval ratings, unlike Tony Blair and George W. Bush, who had been
personally damaged for their leadership roles in the continuing War in Iraq.
Labor won the 2007 election with a two-party preferred swing of 5.44 per cent,
securing swings in all states, even Western Australia. Labor won twenty-three seats.
Remarkably, the Prime Minister, John Howard, lost his own seat of Bennelong. It
was only the second time since federation that a Prime Minister had lost his seat.
Labor also made gains in the Senate, winning an additional four seats. The major
party vote in the Senate was higher than at any time in the preceding decade. New
South Wales (NSW), Queensland and Victoria divided their six seats between the
major parties. In Queensland, Ron Boswell was re-elected on a separate National
Party ticket. The Labor vote was weaker in South Australia (SA) and Western
Australia (WA), and the Liberals were weaker in SA and Tasmania. In SA, an
Independent, Nick Xenophon, and a Green, Sarah Hanson-Young, were elected. In
Tasmania, a Green Senator, Party Leader Bob Brown, was re-elected, and in WA a
Green was the sixth Senator elected. Consequently, the Australian Democrats failed
to secure the re-election of their four remaining Senators and the party disappeared
from the Parliament on 1 July 2008.
This issue on the historic 2007 election includes the first cut of papers from the
Academy of the Social Sciences Workshop of early 2008; a follow up issue will
incorporate additional papers, mainly focusing upon overarching ideas, ideologies
and issues with longer-term implications. The original Workshop was divided into
six parts: the overview, the campaign, the parties’ perspectives, the states and
regions, social constituencies and the results.
Much of the lively discussion at the Workshop related to the role of the Labor
Party’s new leadership team, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, the reasons for the
failure of the Howard team to retain its previous popularity and the loss of the Prime
Minister’s own seat of Bennelong. Underpinning the analysis was agreement relating
to the interesting nature of the Rudd/Gillard campaign and the significance of the
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Coalition Government gaining a Senate majority in July 2005. This issue includes
selected papers from each part with more immediate relevance to the key issues that
emerged at the Workshop.
The paper by Marian Simms on the campaigns shows that the Australian
Labor Party’s (ALP) precampaigns featured the new leadership team of Kevin
Rudd and Julia Gillard, elected by Caucus in December 2006.2 The Howard
Government pressed on with its selling of government policies and programmes,
but was forced to respond to issues raised by Labor and entered the October
campaign on the defensive. The 2007 election campaign itself ‘. . .became a testing
ground for the Liberal leadership team of John Howard and Peter Costello and a
proving ground for the new opposition leadership team of Kevin Rudd and Julia
Gillard’.3
Crucial to the decline and defeat of the Howard–Costello Government were its
legislative changes after its Senate majority in 2005. The early closure of the electoral
rolls and other changes that fuelled the actions of interest groups, such as GetUp!,
was one such change outlined by Brian Costar in his discussion of electoral law
and the introduction of WorkChoices was another.4
David Adams outlines the parallel stories of the rise of Kevin Rudd who, by
November 2007, ‘was more in touch with voters. . .more likeable. . .[and] cared more
for people’5 and the failure of Howard to make additional ground. Howard was not
falling behind, but was staying in the same place. Still, according to Adams, Rudd
remains an enigma.6 Murray Goot’s paper demonstrates the importance of the polls
in fuelling the leadership debate and points to their limitations as accurate
predictors. He states that for the two-party preferred vote ‘the prize for the most
accurate poll was a three-way tie: Galaxy and Newspoll, both of which put Labor’s
two-party preferred at 52 per cent (when the election result was finalised the official
figure was 52.7 per cent) and the Morgan phone poll (53.5 per cent)’.7 More
problematic ‘were: the Morgan face-to face poll. . .Nielsen online. . .and the Nielsen
phone poll’.8 He also argues that there was a worrying trend that sections of the print
media ‘hedged their bets’ rather than presenting a more accurate reporting of the poll
findings.9
A feature of this Workshop series is the analysis of states and regions. Three
states were significant in 2007: NSW, Queensland and SA. The others were
deemed by their authors to be ‘boring’ (Australian Capital Territory), largely
overlooked (Victoria), interesting from a Green’s perspective (Tasmania) or not
contributing to the Labor Victory (WA). Elaine Thompson examines the impact
of the 2005 redistribution on New South Wales, which lost the long-standing
Nationals’ seat of Gwydir when its overall numbers were reduced from fifty to
forty-nine.10 Labor’s gains in NSW were attributable to its ‘hard work’, and
‘complacency’ on the part of the Liberal leadership. Thompson also examines the
campaigns in such high-profile seats as Bennelong, Wentworth, Eden Monaro,
Parramatta and Lindsay.11
Ian Ward discusses the crucial role of the Queensland campaign, even though ‘it
contained but two of the coalition’s sixteen most vulnerable seats, namely Bonner
(0.5 per cent) and Moreton (2.8 per cent)’.12 The ‘2005 redistribution added a new
division—Flynn in central Queensland—[leaving] Labor holding six of twenty-nine
Queensland seats’.13 Significantly, both major party campaign launches were held in

































Dean Jaensch shows how important SA was to the campaign.14 Although there
were only eleven seats, the State enjoyed regular visits from both leadership teams.
The Labor vote improved considerably, because it had been in the ‘doldrums’ since
the State Bank collapse of 1993. The Senate result saw volatile independent Nick
Xenophon elected as a member of the tiny team holding the balance of power after
July 2008.
The papers from the social constituencies section proved important in ways
unforeseen. For example, James Jupp’s analysis of the role of the Chinese vote in
the defeat of John Howard in Bennelong was particularly interesting.15 However,
unlike 2001 (The ‘Tampa’ election), overall immigration and ethnic issues played
little part in the campaign itself, despite the record high immigration levels
occurring under the Coalition. Marian Sawer’s paper on women was of particular
relevance because the election resulted in Australia’s first female Deputy Prime
Minister.16 Marian Sawer shows that despite Australia having its first female
Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Liberal Party leader, in fact the ALP had
‘gone to the polls without a woman’s policy. . .for the first time in twenty years’.17
After the election, women constituted 20 per cent of the ALP cabinet and 10 per
cent of the shadow Ministry.
One important feature of the Workshop was the session with presentations by
practitioners; first, because the parties’ research now features as part of the media
discussion over polls and poll findings; and, second, because behind closed doors
academics have the opportunity to question party officials and other insiders over
strategic issues. Published here are edited versions of the conversations. In 2008, the
first afternoon session featured a presentation by the ALP Research Director Nick
Martin, on behalf of its (then) National Secretary Tim Gartrell. Nick provided an
interesting overview of the ALP campaign and fielded many questions regarding
tactics and strategies, thus confirming the value of such sessions for academics that
research and teach on elections. The Liberals’ Brian Loughnane argues that the
election campaign was not the determining factor in the Coalition’s election loss.
Rather, Liberal party research showed that the defeat ‘was driven more by longer-
term strategic issues than a series of short-term tactical events. . .to the magnitude of
our defeat’.18 The Labor Party’s former national secretary Tim Gartrell does not
disagree, in the sense that he attributes Labor’s victory to the ‘year-long campaign’,
based on ‘new values’.19 From the ALP perspective, Maxine McKew’s win in
Bennelong was ‘iconic’. Former Queensland Australian Democrats Senator Andrew
Bartlett argues that, after the 2004 election, when the Party lost four seats (including
the Democrat seat Meg Lees had taken with her when she resigned from the party in
2002), ‘the party faced a very difficult task in the 2007 election trying to keep its four
remaining Senate seats’.20
Rodney Cavalier, a former NSW State Education Minister and writing as an
‘insider on the outside’, argues that good leadership was pivotal for the 2007 result,
arguing that the ‘mood for change has existed since not later than 2000, a mood with
which the Labor leadership had not connected in 2001 and 2004’.21 Hence, Rudd’s
achievement was in recognising that ‘mood’ and working with it. Cavalier argues
that ‘the same inclination for change had existed in 1990 and 1993; the then
Opposition failed to offer a leadership who could persuade the electorate the benefits
of change were greater than sticking with the government’.22
The Kevin Rudd ‘leadership’ factor was also picked up in the Australian Election
Survey and, according to Clive Bean and Ian McAllister, was responsible for part of































the swing to Labor,23 second only to industrial relations, which was a central feature
of the campaign and the political debate over the previous year. Overall, Labor
scored well among the under twenty-fives and manual workers, helping to restore it
to previous levels.
Malcolm Mackerras argues that the Howard Government suffered a ‘respectable
loss’ rather than the landslide suggested by some commentators, and ‘Labor gained
most in 2007 where it had lost most in 2004’.24 Mackerras provides details of the
state-by-state swings for the House and the Senate.25 Labor made few metropolitan
gains, the most notable being Bennelong. Mackerras attributes this result to
demographic changes.
Looking ahead to the next election—expected in late 2010—the articles in this
special issue agree that a small number of factors were responsible for the defeat of
the Howard Government and the loss of the seat of Bennelong. This sets the stage
for the next election to be highly contested and makes the leadership question on
both sides salient.
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